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     The dual process theory is a view that there are two information-processing systems 
in our mind and that we often employ either or both of them in a wide variety of 
problem-solving tasks. This theory has attracted considerable attention in cognitive and 
social psychology for the last decade, but this does not mean that there have been no 
challenges to the theory. In particular, a concern about underlying mechanisms for each 
system is one of the most serious objections. In this paper I shall explore how we can 
interpret the theory so that it can meet this challenge. I will argue that the dual process 
theorists may be overly optimistic for the prospect of finding underlying causal basis 
for each system in neural regions, because according to recent findings, almost any 
single brain region is involved in a wide variety of tasks and it is hard to find the region 
primarily responsible for each system. Instead, I will argue, the dual process theorists 
should seek for the causal basis in evolutionary history. 
Overview of the dual process theory
     Dual process accounts have been explored in various fields of psychology, such as 
cognitive and social psychology, to explain conflicting responses subjects give in an 
experiment. Although the details differ from one account to another, the basic tenet is 
similar: the subjects have two distinct information-processing systems, each of which 
has a cluster of distinctive characteristics, and those systems are responsible for the 
conflicting responses.
     Take deductive inference to illustrate how a dual process account is called for (Evans 
2003). Psychologists found that when we are asked to check the validity of a syllogistic 
inference, many of us take one of the two strategies: first, we may simply look at the 
believability of the conclusion and infer the inference is valid when the conclusion 
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seems true (this is often called the belief bias). At other times, however, we may draw 
an Euler diagram and confirm that the conclusion must be true when all the premises 
are true. Jonathan Evans, a leading supporter of the dual process theory, observes that 
90% of subjects see valid arguments with a believable conclusion as valid, while less 
than 60% think valid arguments with an unbelievable conclusion are invalid. The dual 
process theorists propose that this is because we have two kinds of mental processes. 
Each kind of processes are characterized by a cluster of properties------when we 
“intuitively” judge the validity with the help of a cue, our response is automatic, quick, 
and taking less mental effort, but prone to error; in contrast, thinking “deliberatively” by 
drawing a diagram takes much more mental effort and time but leads us to the correct 
judgment in many cases. 
     This is how a dual process account is called for in deductive inference. But what is 
striking is that dual process accounts have been proposed in various areas of psychology, 
including reasoning (Wason selection task, hypothetical thinking, etc.), judgment and 
decision making (judgment of probability, decision making under risk, social judgment 
theory), and social cognition (processing of social information: person perception, 
stereotyping, and attitude change). And there is significant overlap in what the authors 
list as properties of each kind of process. (Evans (2008) summarizes the properties 
in a table; see Table 1). The dual process theorists argue that this overlap is no mere 
coincidence. Rather it is evidence for the existence of two processes, or systems in our 
mind. There are two distinct systems with a cluster of properties working across these 
phenomena. 
     It is worth noting that those properties associated with either system in the list are 
correlated with each other. If a subject’s response in one experiment exhibits a property 
of System 1 (say quickness), then it is likely to have other properties in the list, such as 
implicitness, automaticity, domain-specificity, and mental effortlessness. The same is 
true of System 2: if one’s response is slow, then it is likely to have other properties of 
System 2: being explicit and controlled, generality, and taking high mental effort. Some 
of the correlations are found by changing experimental conditions 1 .
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Lack of causal basis
     One of the criticisms frequently levelled at the dual process theory is that it is nothing 
but a list of property-pairs as in Table 1 (Keren & Schul, 2009; Sahlin et al., 2010). 
One way to reply to this objection is to find causal basis for each process. Properties 
listed above are largely phenomenological and do not refer to underlying causal basis: 
type-1 processes largely work automatically, but it is not clear what is behind this 
automaticity. The theory would be better supported if each kind of process has material 
or neurological foundation, one might argue.
Table 1. Characteristics typically associated to the two kinds of processes. From Evans (2008).
     This is why the dual process theorists have attempted to find deeper causal 
mechanisms for phenomenological properties. For example, Evans (2010) cites the 
neurological studies by Matthew Lieberman (2007). In these studies, Lieberman 
attempts to find neural regions corresponding to Systems 1 and 2 by using brain-imaging 
technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). As a result of 
these experiments, he assigns brain regions such as basal ganglia, amygdala, and lateral 
temporal cortex to System 1 and regions such as medial temporal lobe, posterior parietal 
cortex, and rostral ACC to System 2. 
The “intuitive” process (System 1) The “deliberative” process (System 2)
Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent
Shared with animals Unique to humans
Unconscious, preconscious Conscious
High capacity Low capacity
Fast Slow
Automatic Controlled or volitional
Low effort High effort
Parallel Sequential
Implicit knowledge Explicit knowledge
Contextualist, belief based Abstract, decontextualized
Linked with emotion No direct link with emotion
Independent of individual differences in
general intelligence and working
memory capacity
Correlated with individual differences
in intelligence and working memory
capacity
Ecological or evolutionary rationality Normative rationality
     Yet it is not clear how far Evans can get by appealing to the studies like those, 
because some researchers, such as Michael Anderson (2010), doubt that there is a strong 
one-to-one correspondence between cognitive tasks and brain regions; most brain 
regions are involved in a much wider range of tasks than those authors might expect. 
Anderson proposes the neural reuse hypothesis, according to which “neural circuits 
established for one purpose are commonly exapted ... during evolution or normal 
development, and put to different uses, often without losing their original functions” 
(p. 246). For instance, he observes that out of 968 anatomical brain regions reported 
to be active at least in one task domain ------including execution, vision, attention, and 
language------ over 90% of them are active in more than one domain. If his hypothesis 
is on the right track, then one should not be overly optimistic about the prospects for 
finding the brain regions responsible for either kind of process.
Reflective and intuitive minds as evolutionary functional kinds
     In this section I shall argue that if we interpret the dual process theory in terms of 
their evolutionary functions, it could solve the problem of causal basis for the two 
minds. The two minds are evolutionary functional kinds: Each mind is to solve different 
evolutionary problems.
Functional kind
     A functional kind is characterized by its (causal) role its members play and has an 
explanatory force in a scientific theory due to those roles. Take money as an example of 
a functional kind. Money is a functional kind because of its roles in generalization and 
explanation in economics. There are regularities or laws in economics concerning the 
relationships money takes to other objects: if more money is supplied to the economy of 
a country by central bank, then there is likely to be inflation. Money illustrates multiple 
realizability of a functional kind. Money can take different physical forms: it can take 
the form of a bill or coins or tobacco.  
     An evolutionary functional kind is a group of evolutionary traits which evolved and 
is designed to resolve the same or similar adaptive tasks. In other words, such a kind 
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is analogical traits as opposed to homological traits which share evolutionary origin 
with each other. Wings in birds and insects are a familiar example of analogical traits-
-----both are solutions to the same or similar adaptive task (flying in the sky) but were 
invented independently in the evolutionary history. The reason why they have similar 
functions is that they are solutions to the same adaptive problems, not because the 
similarity at hand was inherited to them from their common ancestor. 
     Biological analogues have key features in common with money. The concept of 
analogy has explanatory force. Birds’ and insects’ wings share some properties, such 
as relative weight to body mass and aerodynamic structure. One can explain why they 
share those properties but not others because of the selection pressure shared by birds 
and flying insects. Analogues are multiply realizable, too. Birds’ and insects’ wings 
are wings, even though their physical composition is very different. Thus an analogue 
constitutes a functional kind (Brigandt, 2010).
Two minds as evolutionary functional kinds
     So much for the description of a functional kind. My proposal is that the dual process 
theory can meet the challenge if the two systems are evolutionary functional kinds: they 
are designed to solve different (adaptive) tasks, as wings and heart are designed to solve 
different adaptive problems. Put simply, the two systems are evolutionary analogues. 
Then the question is what problem each mind is designed to solve. A brief sketch of the 
problems will be the following: 
We have seen that the properties in a cluster characterizing each system are correlated 
with each other (p. 70). Now if we reflect upon the correlations from natural selection 
and problem-solving, they seem to point to two different cognitive strategies we 
・T he intuitive mind: designed to solve swiftly and automatically typically simple 
cognitive-adaptive problems which we routinely encounter in our life or our 
evolutionary history, by giving a specific output to a specific environmental cue. 
・T he reflective mind: designed to solve complex problems in novel and 
unforeseeable environments even with taking considerable time and cognitive 
resources. 
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adopt, and it is thus explained why those properties are in fact correlated. Let us look 
at the familiar trade-offs between the reliability of a solution and its costs. Checking 
the validity of a deductive inference illustrates this (p. 69). To evaluate the validity of a 
syllogism with drawing an Euler diagram is to increase the reliability of our judgment, 
but it comes at the expense of additional time and mental effort. To look only at the 
truth value of its conclusion will certainly save time and mental effort, but our judgment 
will be less reliable. That is, there is a trade-off relationship between the accuracy or 
reliability of a judgment and costs in time and mental effort.
     Trade-offs like this point to two broad cognitive-adaptive strategies in our mind. The 
first, “cost-sensitive” strategy is to put more stringent time and energy constraints in 
problem-solving at the expense of the accuracy or reliability of a solution. The reliability 
still matters for this strategy, but it does so as long as it doesn’t cost too much time 
and mental effort. Looking only at the truth value of a conclusion is an instance of this 
strategy. The other, “reliability-raising” strategy is to put more stringent constraints 
on the reliability and justification of a solution. If reliability really counts, one could 
take time to make sure that she really reaches the right conclusion. Drawing an Euler 
diagram to check the validity of an inference is an instance of this strategy. Then one 
can make sense of the observed property correlations of either type of process: they can 
be seen as supporting the case for the two cognitive-adaptive strategies. Correlations 
among the properties of type 1 processes, such as quickness, automaticity, and mental 
effortlessness, can be viewed as a result of taking the cost-sensitive strategy; while 
correlations among explicitness, reflectiveness, abstractness, and so on can be tied to the 
reliability-raising strategy.
     Although we could in principle take either strategy regardless of the problem 
we face, one strategy could still be more effective in resolving a particular kind of 
cognitive-adaptive problems than the other. This suggests the possibility that the two 
minds are adaptations to different types of cognitive-adaptive problems. As several 
authors suggest (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Stanovich, 2004; Evans, 2010), the cost-
sensitive strategy typically taken by System 1 is good at solving a problem we routinely 
encounter in our environment. Take the in-group/out-group distinction as an example. 
There is a psychological tendency in us to classify anyone we encounter into in-group 
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(“us”) or out-group (“them”) in a relatively short time. Our hominid ancestors frequently 
met this problem of identification in their environment. If we encounter it time and 
again, and if giving a relatively simple response to a behavioral or physical cue in the 
environment suffices to solve the problem, then it is not adaptive to spend much time 
and mental energy to solve it. It is because we could otherwise assign those resources to 
deal with other, more complex problems, which may be more important in survival and 
reproduction. A familiar instance of such complex problems is the problem of dealing 
with one’s peers in changing social environment (see, for example, Byrne & Whiten, 
1988; Sterelny, 2003). Cognitive-adaptive problems in social environment is generally 
complex because of the possibility of exploitation. If a male individual is in an alliance 
with another male to seek for dominance in his group (de Waal, 1982), he should always 
be aware of the possibility that his ally may betray him. To decide what to do depending 
on a simple cue is not a good strategy in a changing and complex environment.
Conclusions
     The dual process theory has been popular in cognitive and cultural psychology in 
the last decade, but there are objections to it as well. One of the most serious objections 
concerns the apparent lack of causal basis of the two Systems. We suggested that the 
attempt by some dual process theorists to find causal basis for the two minds in neural 
circuits might be misplaced given that any brain regions are capable of playing a 
wide variety of functions. Instead, it was suggested that we should seek for the causal 
underpinnings in evolutionary history: the two Systems are adaptations to different 
cognitive-adaptive tasks. This view explains why the properties associated to each kind 
of a process are mutually correlated as they are.
Notes
1.  Here I assume that each “system” is a homeostatic property cluster kind the members of which 
share the clusters of characters. See the discussion in Samuels (2008). 
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